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Increasing Health Care Access in Yemen
Through Community-Based Health Insurance
MATTHEW Fuss*
ABSTRACT
This Note addresses the implementation of health insurance reform
in Yemen. As a result of a system of user fees and a lack of health
insurance, the current regime poses serious barriers to health care access
for Yemen's uninsured citizens. When the dust settles from the ongoing
conflict with Houthi rebels, the time will be ripe for replacing Yemen's
health financing system. In order to rebuild trust and curb abuse in the
public health system, legal reforms are required to implement health
insurance through decentralized decision-making and accountability
measures. The Welfare Regime Framework accommodates these general
reforms through policies that reflect the particular circumstances of
Yemen. The implementation of health insurance reform will require
policy reforms that bring together local, national, and international
stakeholders to finance and develop management capacity for
community-based health insurance in Yemen.
INTRODUCTION
Yemen underwent a peaceful political movement in the aftermath of
the Arab Spring of 2011, which resulted in the ousting of then-President
Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2012.1 On February 21, 2012, Abd Rabbuh
Mansur Hadi was elected the new president, to be followed by a two-
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1. Helen Lackner, Introduction to WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION 1,
1 (Helen Lackner ed., 2014); Shadi S. Saleh et al., The Path Towards Universal Health
Coverage in the Arab Uprising Countries Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, 383 LANCET
368, 374 (2014).
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year transition period.2 However, by March 2014, President Abd
Rabbuh Mansur Hadi had fled Yemen after Houthi rebels took control of
the capital Sana'a. 3 The ensuing conflict has caused a humanitarian
crisis and an overall institutional failure of Yemen's government. 4 The
regime that emerges in the aftermath of this turmoil will have to
prioritize Yemen's basic needs, including water, education, employment,
and health care. Given the material effect of a nation's health on its
productivity and prosperity, Yemen should prioritize legal reforms to its
health systems. 5 While globalization has led to a thriving private health
sector in Yemen, it has also encouraged reduced public expenditures
and user fees at the point of purchase. Consequently, only those
employees provided with employer-sponsored health insurance have
benefited from globalization, while the vast majority of Yemeni citizens
continue to have limited access to health care.
The lack of equal access to health care is particularly prevalent
among the 70 percent of Yemen's working population who are part of
the "informal sector," which is defined as the largely poor, wage-
employed and self-employed workers not covered by health insurance
programs. 6 Within the informal sector, there are many Yemeni citizens
unprotected from the financial risks of poor health resulting from
Yemen's system of user fees. 7 The health system in Yemen also faces a
number of other constraints, including limited health service coverage,
lack of coordinated management, inadequate community involvement,
and inadequate information and monitoring systems.8 These constraints
2. Helen Lackner, in WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION Why Yemen
Matters, supra note 1, at xvi.
3. Dan Stewart, Yemen's Neglected Disaster, TIME, Nov. 9, 2015, at 40.
4. Id. at 43.
5. See Adel Aulaqi, On the Edge: The Challenges of Yemen's Healthcare System, in
WHY YEMEN MATTERS: A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION, supra note 1, at 235-36. By "health
reform," this Note refers to the political process for eliminating flaws in health care
systems "and the corresponding deployment of a more effective, better-balanced, more
appropriate array of means or resources to maximize health status." Eugene B. Gallagher,
Modernization and Health Reform in Saudi Arabia, in HEALTH CARE REFORM AROUND
THE WORLD 181, 184 (Andrew C. Twaddle ed., 2002).
6. See Yoonyoung Cho, Informality and Protection from Health Shocks: Lessons from
Yemen 3, 29-30 (The World Bank Human Dev. Network Soc. Prot. & Labor Unit, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 5746, 2011) ("Wage employed workers provided with pension
or health insurance or both are formal, whereas workers without access to social
insurance coverage are informal.").
7. See DETLEF SCHWEFEL ET AL., DEUTSCHE GESELISCHAFT FOR TECHNISCHE
ZUSAMMENARBEIT GMBH INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, TOWARDS A NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM IN YEMEN 33-35 (2005).
8. See id. at 33; see also Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 248-50 (discussing future challenges
in the effort to reform Yemen's health system).
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are exacerbated by Yemeni citizens' distrust of both public and private
health systems.9
Unfortunately, efforts in the past to implement a national health
insurance system never materialized. Even when sensible reforms to
the health system were enacted, they ultimately failed because of poor
implementation and underfunding. 10 The void caused by this decrease
in public expenditure on health has been filled by the private health
sector, which is particularly problematic because most Yemenis have no
health insurance." And even when public health care benefits are
offered, they "are tailored to maximise cost-sharing revenues and
revenues from informal payments."' 2 Rather than focusing on ability to
pay, health insurance reform should promote a system of providing
health care based on need.
The solution proposed in this Note is a community-based health
insurance (CHI) scheme targeted to serve the informal sector. This
approach requires legal reforms aimed at transforming Yemen's current
system of user fees into one based on prepayment and risk pooling.
Implementing reforms entailing prepayment, however, will require
gaining the trust of the Yemeni public, which, given the history of
government mismanagement and corruption, will be no small task.
Accordingly, the new government should pass a framework law to create
an independent national health insurance authority (NHIA). Creation of
the NHIA should be paired with bottom-up reforms to implement CHI
programs. Additionally, the NHIA should coordinate its efforts with
international organizations that provide technical assistance and
financial support to implement these CHI programs. Local, national,
and international stakeholders should work within a Welfare Regime
Framework. The Welfare Regime Framework would accommodate these
stakeholders through top-down and bottom-up reforms. These reforms
would address the practical issues of implementation, such as "who
should be covered and how, the goods and services to be included in a
benefit package, compulsory health insurance financing, and what
entity should administer and oversee it."13 To address these practical
issues, the NHIA would serve a stewardship role by financing,
9. See Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 375.
10. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 41 (describing a public drug fund in Yemen
that drastically reduced the prices for essential drugs but was shut down in 2005 due to
corruption and poorly administered exemption policies).
11. See Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 372, 374.
12. SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 45; see also Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 243 (noting
that the current health system in Yemen relies significantly on the private sector, which is
driven by financial concerns rather than patient welfare).
13. Jennifer Prah Ruger & Daniel Kress, Health Financing and Insurance Reform in
Morocco, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1009, 1012 (2007).
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decentralizing decision-making, and employing approaches that ensure
accountability and quality in its network of CHI programs.
The balance of this Note is divided into four parts. Part I discusses
global trends in health care reform and health policy in general as well
as health care in the Arab world in particular. Part II provides an
overview of Yemen's current health care system. Part III explicates the
Welfare Regime Framework as a basis for social policy reform. Lastly,
Part IV provides approaches for effectively implementing health
insurance reform at the community, national, and international levels.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND HEALTH CARE POLICY
A. Global Trends in Health Care Reforms
National health systems are organized and limited "by the culture,
resources, and values of a country, yet operate in a field of medical care
and normative policies which is open to international exchange and
learning.14 Likewise, health care reforms are often influenced by
national concerns for protecting patients' and citizens' rights to health
yet are still subject to the economic realities of trade liberalization and
global integration that characterize globalization. 15
There are five current trends of globalization that influence health
policy: (1) global competitiveness requires states to lower the costs of
their health policies by moving to "a more contractual and competitive
bidding to deliver services" as a means to limit the size of the public
sector workforce; (2) innovation plays a key role in global
competitiveness and requires greater engagement with the private and
commercial sectors; (3) the pursuit of economic growth eventually
replaces existing health policy priorities as health systems become a
resource base for globalizing industries (e.g., telemedicine and advanced
medical technologies); (4) the portability of benefits required by
globalization results in health systems that accommodate increased
migration; and (5) international agreements play an important role in
delimiting national health policy domains. 16
Health care reforms in countries belonging to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) began in the 1980s
and came in two phases. 17 The first phase saw the splitting of purchaser
14. JONATHAN TRITTER ET AL., GLOBALISATION, MARKETS AND HEALTHCARE POLICY:
REDRAWING THE PATIENT AS CONSUMER 29 (Simon J. Williams & Gillian Bendelow eds.,
2010).
15. See id. at 75.
16. Id. at 30-31.
17. Id. at 32-37.
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and provider functions. These reforms led states to take on a purchasing
role while entering into contractual relationships with private providers
to plan markets and manage competition in order to lower cost and
improve efficiency. While this first phase of health care reforms in
OECD countries focused more on the supply side, the second phase
focused more on the demand side by emphasizing patients as consumers
and granting them rights to choose their service provider.' 8 In other
words, the conception of health care among policymakers has shifted
from a publicly-provided benefit to a consumer good purchased on the
open market.
B. Global Policy Influences
Global policies that influence a state's health care system can be
grouped into the following policy domains: (1) the direct influence of
global intergovernmental agencies through agreements with the state
(e.g., the World Health Organization (WHO)); (2) the indirect influence
of global intergovernmental agencies effected through changes of
national policy resulting from non-health-care sector commitments (e.g-,
trade agreements); (3) the direct and indirect influences of global
nongovernmental organizations; and (4) the influence of global ideas
transmitted outside global agencies through research and consulting. 19
Intergovernmental agencies have played a key role in influencing
health care reforms. For example, the WHO and United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF) organized the Alma-Ata Conference, in
which they formalized the "Health for All" strategy in 1978.20 This
strategy emphasizes the importance of primary health care in any
comprehensive health care reform and the inclusion of community
participation in the planning and organization of primary health care;?'
it also emphasizes cooperation with other public-sector actors within
each country as part of a comprehensive approach to reforming national
health systems. 22
The entry of the World Bank into the dialogue on health care reform
in the early 1990s marked a shift from the WHO's "Health for All"
strategy to one concerned more with equity, universal access, and sound
18. See id. at 36.
19. See id. at 55.
20. Id. at 57.
21. See Guy Carrin et al., Community-Based Health Insurance in Developing Countries:
A Study of its Contribution to the Performance of Health Financing Systems, 10 TROPICAL
MED. & INTL HEALTH 799, 800 (2005).
22. TRITTER ET AL., supra note 14, at 57.
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financing.23 This World Bank strategy contributed to health care
reforms in developing and transitioning countries. The World Bank
enunciated these policy priorities in the Ljubljana Conference of 1996,
during which the World Bank also pushed to limit the privatization of
health care systems. 24
The shift in focus to equity and universal access is consonant with
the United Nations' (U.N.) stipulations on human rights: Article 12 of
the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
"recognize[s] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health."25 In that 151
countries have signed this covenant, it serves as an authoritative source
of the right to health. The right to health was perhaps most importantly
defined in 2006 by Paul Hunt, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right
of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health: "The right to health can be understood as
the right to an effective ... health system encompassing health care...
which is . . . accessible to all. Underpinned by the right to health, an
effective health system is a core social institution, no less than a court
system or a political system." 26 The right to health also entails "financial
and physical accessibility to services . . . in a non-discriminatory
manner."
27
C. Globalization and Health Care in the Arab World
In line with the U.N.'s pronouncement on the right to health, the
constitutions of many Arab countries protect access to health care. 28 In
the latter half of the twentieth century, the Arab world's health systems
were dominated by socialist policies calling for a strong role for the state
in the financing, provision, and organization of free universal health
care. 29 By the late 1980s, however, these policies proved to be financially
unsustainable.30 Due to budget deficits, health facilities were left
without necessary resources, and physicians were underpaid. 31 As a
result, countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen looked for ways
23. See id. at 32-33.
24. Id. at 58.
25. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
26. World Health Org. [WHO] & Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights
[OHCHR], The Right to Health, 1, Joint Fact Sheet WHO/OHCHR/323 (Aug. 2007).
27. Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 376 (citing WHO & OHCHR, supra note 26, at 2).
28. See id. at 368, 371.
29. See id. at 371.
30. See id. at 372.
31. See id. at 371.
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to supplement public financing for health care. This shift was
accompanied by increased interest from international organizations like
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to expand their
investments in social development projects.32
Development theories in the late 1980s promoted liberalizing trade
and reducing the role of the state in general. 33 In 1987, the World Bank
called for user fees as a solution for recovering some of the cost of public
expenditures on health.34 The reduction in public spending on health
left public health services unable to meet patients' needs, which led
patients to seek private care.35 Moreover, governments pursued robust
privatization policies, including outsourcing the provision of health
services to private providers altogether.
At the turn of the millennium, international agencies generally
concluded that the system of user fees was inefficient and served as a
barrier to health care access for low-income populations. 36 In 2005, the
World Health Assembly passed Resolution 58.33, which urged Member
States to switch to systems of prepayment in order to finance health
care. Nevertheless, many countries in the Arab world continued to
reduce their public financing of health services while also leaving in
place their systems of user fees. 37
II. HEALTH CARE IN YEMEN
A. Historical Context of Health Insurance
From 1967 to 1990, there were two Yemeni states: the socialist-
backed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the
Western-backed Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).38 Yemen's unification in
1990 coincided with increased liberalization of the health care system. 39
Prior to unification, the YAR had allowed a private health system to
develop alongside its publicly-funded system, while the PDRY
maintained a strict socialist system that disallowed private
32. See id. at 372 ("This shift for investment beyond classic projects for economic
growth (eg, transportation and energy) was encouraged by development theories that by
the 1980s advocated the importance of meeting individuals' basic needs (eg, health,
nutrition, and education).").
33. See id. at 372.
34. See id.
35. See id. (describing the process known as passive privatization, whereby patients
are indirectly pushed into the private sector).
36. See id. at 373.
37. See id. at 373-74.
38. Lackner, supra note 2, at xiii-xiv.
39. Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 372.
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healthcare. 40 After unification, health care in Yemen became an
amalgamation of the YAR and PDRY systems.41 Starting in the mid-
2000s Yemen began to encourage a market approach to health care,
with its citizens increasingly turning to the private sector for care.42
This shift, in combination with reduced public health budgets and user
fees, negatively affected Yemen's poorest citizens and its rural areas.43
B. Political Context
As opposed to most of the regime changes that occurred during the
Arab Spring of 2011, change in Yemen was peaceful. 44 In the fall of
2011, Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down under an
agreement that called for elections in early 2012. 4 5 On February 21,
2012, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi was elected the new President of
Yemen.46 A two-year transitional regime was expected to follow the
presidential elections. 47
Yemen is unique in the Arabian Peninsula, as it is the only
republican regime with regular elections. 48 Nevertheless, due to the rise
of international jihadism, attention from the outside world has been
focused more on security issues than on civil and economic reforms.
Additionally, Yemen faces a number of political challenges, including
"southern separatism, sectarianism in the far north, and miscellaneous
class and tribal issues everywhere."49 Following the takeover of Sana'a
by Houthi rebels and President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi's flight from
the country in March 2014, a coalition of ten Arab nations led by Saudi
Arabia and supported by the United States began an air campaign
against the Houthi rebels.50 Yemen is currently faced with a near
collapse of its political institutions.
40. See Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 236-37.
41. See id. at 237.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 237-39; see also Helen Lackner, supra note 1, at 1, 14-15 (noting that
roughly half of Yemen's population lives in poverty and about 70 percent live in rural
areas).
44. See Lackner, supra note 1, at 1.
45. Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 374.
46. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Situation of
Human Right in Yemen, 4, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/34 (July 25,
2013).
47. Lackner, supra note 1, at 12.
48. Lackner, supra note 1, at 2.
49. Id. at 2.
50. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 38, 40.
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C. Health Service Access
Health care access and even distribution of health services have
long been problems in Yemen, 51 even though the Yemeni constitution
guarantees the right to health care for everyone. 52 Roughly 35 percent of
Yemeni citizens do not receive access in times of need,5 3 and access to
curative services is limited to 68 percent of the population, whereas 32
percent are without services entirely. 54 This resource allocation in
Yemen leads to inequitable results as 30 percent of total health
spending goes to treatment abroad for a small number of patients: those
who can afford to incur the travel expenses.
55
There is also geographic inequity in the distribution of access to
health services-25 percent of rural areas have access, as opposed to 80
percent of urban areas.5 6 Moreover, because most Government
Healthcare System (GHS) hospitals and private hospitals are
concentrated in urban areas, some 70 percent of the total population
does not have easy access to specialist care and would face great
expense in traveling to urban facilities.
57
D. Health Services
1. Public Health Services
The public health care system in Yemen consists of four levels: (1)
2,929 primary health care units, (2) 184 district hospitals, (3) fifty-three
general hospitals, and (4) two specialist referral hospitals. 58 GHS
hospitals often suffer from a lack of human resources and leadership,
and some rural hospitals stay closed for months at a time because of
insufficient staffing.5
9
51. See generally Sharon Lambeth, Health Care in the Yemen Arab Republic, 25 INT'L
J. NURSING STUD. 171 (1988) (outlining the Yemen Arab Republic's five-year plan initiated
in 1977 to improve access to and equalize distribution of healthcare and looking at some of
the resource shortages that hindered that plan).
52. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF YEMEN Feb. 20, 2001, art. 55 (stating
that "[h]ealth care is a right for all citizens. The state shall guarantee this by building
various hospitals and health establishments and expanding their care.").
53. HEBA A. ELGAZZAR, WORLD BANK, RAISING RETURNS: THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HEALTH FINANCING AND OUTCOMES IN YEMEN 13 (2011).
54. Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 240.
55. See id. at 238.
56. Id. at 240.
57. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 13, 51.
58. Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 240.
59. See id. at 241.
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To make matters worse, because of a lack of trust and confidence,
patients often bypass first level primary health care units and seek care
at governorate or national hospitals, which is an inefficient use of the
available health resources and creates high health expenditures for
patients.60 Additionally, inadequate public sector health care is
estimated to cause 95 percent of patients to turn to the private health
sector for care.6 1 In an attempt to address such issues, Yemen developed
the District Healthcare System (DHS) in 2002, which delivered primary
health care through community-based services by using mobile health
clinics and district hospitals.62 In the absence of good management,
however, employee absenteeism has undermined the program's
effectiveness.63
2. Private Health Services
Since unification in 1990, Yemen's private sector has thrived,
having increased from 167 private hospitals in 2002, to 746 private
health centers in 2012.64 Such growth in the private sector occurred as
Yemen sought to mitigate the burden of financing a free public health
system. While the private sector owes its success partly to committed
owners and foreign investors,65 the private sector is mostly staffed by
employees of the public sector. Such staffing often results in divided
loyalties and disadvantages the public sector.66 These divided loyalties
create perverse incentives for self-referrals to move patients from public
to private care,67 where salaries are roughly five times higher than in
the public sector.68
E. Health Financing
Because of Yemen's weak economy, it has struggled to fund its
health care system. In 2007, the total health care expenditure in Yemen
was USD 1.14 billion, or USD 60 per capita,6 9 whereas the government
60. See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, HEALTH SECTOR REFORM IN THE REPUBLIC OF
YEMEN: STRATEGY FOR REFORM 18 (2000) (Yemen); SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 34-
35.
61. Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 241.
62. Id. at 244.
63. See id. at 244.
64. Id. at 246.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 33.
68. See Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 246.
69. Id. at 238.
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only contributed USD 463 million of this, or USD 20.22 per capita.70
Between 2007 and 2010, the private, out-of-pocket spending on health
rose from 67 percent of the total health expenditure in Yemen to 71
percent, whereas the public budget for health spending fell from 4
percent to 3.6 percent.71 Moreover, patients who access public health
care must pay user fees at the time of service and purchase prescribed
medicines out of pocket, both of which result in immense burdens when
patients need long-term care. 72 Compounding this problem, "unofficial
fees" are often claimed by health workers, who feel justified in so doing
because they are underpaid and chronically underequipped.
73
F. Proposed Health Insurance Reform
The government of Yemen sought to implement its "Strategy for
Reform" between 1998 and 2001.74 While Yemen achieved 30 percent of
the strategy's proposals, "its incomplete implementation resulted in
much greater expansion of the private sector without the intended
corollary of collaborating closely with and complementing the
Government Health Service." 75 In 2005, the Republic of Yemen issued a
decree to contract the German development aid agency Deutsche
Gesellschaft f'ur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) to draft a proposal
for a national health insurance system;76 however, no reforms were
passed to implement this proposal. 77
In June 2011, Yemen's Cabinet approved a National Health
Strategy, which consisted of a five-year plan "to ensure sustainable
preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services that are of high
quality, ensure user satisfaction and respect equity in distribution of
resources." 78 Nevertheless, this plan did not include any reform to
health financing. Since then, the government of President Abd Rabbuh
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 11-12, 32, 40.
73. See id. at 43-44.
74. Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 242.
75. Id. at 242-43 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 6-8 (recommending three reform strategies:
(1) a "full speed" approach for immediately expanding insurance in the formal sector to
cover nearly half of the Yemeni population; (2) a three-step incremental approach to
reform insurance in the formal sector while concurrently putting in place a full cost-
effective coverage for the poor; (3) a think tank approach for determining the best
practices of community and company-based health insurance).
77. See Aulaqi, supra note 5, at 243.
78. Health Systems Development: National Health Strategy for Yemen 2011-2025,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. REGIONAL OFF. FOR E. MEDITERRANEAN, http://www.emro.who.intl
pdf/yem/programmes/health-systems-development.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2016).
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Mansur Hadi expressed support for strengthening health services in its
commitment to social and human development.7 9 Such political support
is key, because "implementation . . . of a social health insurance policy
will be severely restricted if there is no strong and steady political
support."80 Moreover, political opportunities for major reforms to health
systems occur very rarely.81
Since President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi's flight from Yemen and
the Houthi rebels' seizure of the capital in the spring of 2014, the
ensuing conflict has created a humanitarian crisis, with "more than half
the country's 25 million people ... struggling to find food and almost
two-thirds hav[ing] no access to health care."8 2 The government that
emerges will need to enact policy reforms to address the dire state of
Yemen's health care system.
III. WELFARE REGIME FRAMEWORK FOR HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM IN
YEMEN
The Welfare Regime Framework accepts the global reality of
"mixed" capitalism and acknowledges that markets, states, and
communities must cooperate to meet human needs.8 3 Welfare states are
typically defined as a system in which the state provides social
protections and benefits in combination with labor-market regulation.8 4
However, in developing states, neither the state nor markets are
sufficiently reliable to protect citizens against the insecurity of
markets.8 5 Nevertheless, states that manage to mix the institutional
domains of state, market, and community are able to achieve a more
sustainable framework for well-being.8 6
The welfare regime approach, as applied in the Global North, is
premised on nine principles: (1) capitalism is the dominant mode of
production; (2) class divisions arise from the division of labor between
owners and non-owners of capital; (3) employment in formal labor
79. See Saleh et al., supra note 1, at 376-77.
80. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 799.
81. See Jeremy Hurst, Effective Ways To Realise Policy Reforms in Health Systems, 51
OECD HEALTH WORKING PAPERS 1, 27 (2010).
82. Stewart, supra note 3, at 43; see also Crisis Overview, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR
COORDINATION HUMANITARIAN AFF., http://www.unocha.org/yemen/crisis-overview# (last
visited Mar. 17, 2016) (discussing the displacement of the Yemeni people and their need
for humanitarian assistance).
83. See Geof Wood & Ian Gough, A Comparative Welfare Regime Approach to Global
Social Policy, 34 WORLD DEV. 1696, 1697 (2006).
84. See id. at 1696.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 1697.
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markets is the dominant form of securing one's livelihood; (4) an
interclass political settlement results from the political mobilization of
the working classes; (5) the state is relatively autonomous; (6) social
interventions are circumscribed by the welfare mix of state, market, and
family structures; (7) the welfare mix provides social services; (8) over
time the welfare mix and outcomes reproduce the welfare regime; and
(9) social policy takes place in the public domain and is intended to
achieve welfare-oriented goals.8 7
The term "regime," in the legal sense, is the "set of rules,
institutions and structured interests that constrain individuals through
compliance procedures."88 These rules may emerge formally from the top
down or informally from the bottom up.89 Although the continuance of
regimes tends to be recursive, regimes can be replaced in times of rapid
change or crisis. 90 The rights and duties that emerge in a welfare regime
are shaped by the history of the interrelation of state institutions and
the global economy. Such interrelations are bound by both non-state
and global actors. 91 In other words, social policy reform within a state's
welfare regime takes place in a global context in which markets, states,
and communities must act together to enhance well-being.
92
In the Global South, by contrast, welfare regimes can often be
categorized as informal security regimes, which are "institutional
arrangements where people rely heavily upon community and family
relationships to meet their security needs." 93 Here, "community" refers
to the informal sector in which subsocietal actors and civil society
contribute in defining rights and duties (as compared to the formal
rights defined by the state).94 In such regimes, international actors play
important roles in the welfare mix by providing aid and foreign direct
investment. 95
Social reform under the welfare regime requires a focus on "de-
clientelization." 96 In terms of health insurance reform, de-clientelization
87. Id. at 1699.
88. Id. at 1698.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 1700.
92. See id. at 1697.
93. Id. at 1699 (also noting a second alternative found in developing countries--
"insecurity regimes"-which are defined as "institutional arrangements which generate
gross insecurity and block the emergence of stable informal mechanisms to mitigate ...
these").
94. See id. at 1702.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 1707-08 ("[De-cientelization] refers to the process of de-linking client
dependents from their personalized, arbitrary and discretionary entrapment to persons
with intimate power over them.").
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entails breaking down patients' dependencies on persons with intimate
power over them.97 Reforms based on civil society, including the
informal sector, contribute to de-cientelization.98 However, those in the
informal sector, who are predominantly poor, will only trust social
reforms if the processes for achieving improvements are effectively
implemented or delivered. 99
IV. EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH
INSURANCE IN YEMEN
Establishing a national health-insurance system will help reorient
the health system away from the patient as a client and toward need-
based provision of health care. Such reorientation would be facilitated
by implementing a prepayment system independent of the insured's risk
and by identifying the right welfare mix. This welfare mix would require
a bottom-up approach in order to create CHI programs as well as a top-
down approach for creating a NHIA to steward the implementation of
health insurance reform and coordinate international assistance.
The effective implementation of health-insurance reform can be
enhanced by building trust at the community level, such as by building
on existing initiatives that have already gained the trust of the
population.100 At the national level, the government needs to ensure an
independent NHIA, especially given Yemeni citizens' distrust of public
health care. 101 Lastly, international stakeholders would need to
cooperate with community and national stakeholders to coordinate
technical and financial assistance. 102
A. Community-Based Health Insurance
A CHI scheme for the informal sector and rural population can
supplement the existing insurance already in place for the formal sector
in Yemen.10 3 Establishing CHI programs in Yemen would be
particularly beneficial because it would allow citizens to bypass any
political or organizational difficulties during Yemen's time of political
uncertainty. Community financing serves as a "mechanism whereby
97. See id. at 1708.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 803.
101. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 8, 10.
102. See Samer Jabbour, Health and Development in the Arab World: Which Way
Forward?, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1141, 1143 (2003).
103. See SCHWEFEL ETAL., supra note 7, at 63.
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households in a community (the population in a village, district or other
geographical area . . .) finance or co-finance the . . . capital costs
associated with a given set of health services."'10 4 CHI programs perform
the functions of revenue collection and risk pooling. 10 5
1. Revenue Collection
The target population for CHI in Yemen is the 70 percent of the
working population in the informal sector that currently finances their
health care through a system of user fees. 10 6 The revenue collection in
CHI programs entails a system of prepayments. 10 7 By keeping track of
prepayments, CHI will be better able to gauge accessibility by using the
metric of ratio of prepaid contributions to health expenditure. 08 Most
CHI schemes are designed to cover the portion of out-of-pocket expenses
comprising the prior fee-based system.'0 9 Hence, CHI with a high
enough prepayment ratio will prevent families from having to make
excessive out-of-pocket payment when they need health care and will
help reduce the incidence of catastrophic spending." 0
CHI programs can increase enrollment through subsidies and
building on preexisting programs. To subsidize patients' prepayments,
CHI programs should identify additional sources of financing at the
national and international levels."' Because Yemeni citizens will be
unlikely to participate in CHI until they have had time to trust and be
convinced by the merits of the program,1 1 2 CHI schemes might gain
more quickly their trust by building on preexisting programs already
trusted in the community." 3 One such program is the Child
Development Project (CDP), which was initiated to help reach the
Millennium Development Project's goal of reducing child mortality in
Yemen.1 4 The CDP was designed to improve the nutritional health of
104. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 800.
105. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B.1 (noting the third function of strategic purchasing
that must be carried out in CHI programs; however, due to the amount of technical
assistance required, this task is included within the stewardship provided at the national
level).
106. Cho, supra note 6, at 29.
107. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 801.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 805.
110. See id. (citing a study defining "catastrophic spending" as occurring when patients
spend more than 10% of their annual income on healthcare).
111. See id. at 801.
112. See id. at 803.
113. See id.
114. See World Bank, Republic of Yemen: Health Sector Strategy Note, at 20 (Feb. 2001)
(Sameh E1-Saharty et al.).
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children by mobilizing resources at the community level through
community-based management and community-based interventions. 115
2. Risk Pooling
Successful CHI programs also include risk pooling, which allows
"financial resources to be shared between the healthy and the sick."116
Risk pooling serves as a metric for determining how fairly and equitably
health insurance benefits are distributed by determining the percentage
of the target population actually enrolled.1 17 But when such a system is
based on voluntary enrollment, adverse selection is a risk. In other
words, those with preexisting conditions would be more likely to enroll
than healthy individuals. Such enrollment would negatively impact CHI
by driving up the cost of prepayment. CHI schemes may also require
higher contributions from higher-risk groups, which could lead those
groups to be less willing to enroll.118 Lastly, risk pooling might be met
with cultural resistance in Yemen, where the concept of insurance is
considered haram, or forbidden by the Quran. 119
Three solutions are particularly relevant to resolve the pitfalls of
voluntary CHI programs. Regarding adverse selection, CHI schemes can
establish a qualifying period before individuals can take part in CHI to
discourage individuals from enrolling only when they are ill. 120 Whereas
adverse selection can be resolved at the local level, CHI coverage in
communities containing relatively high-risk populations will depend on
subsidies from national and international stakeholders as a means of
equalizing the risk. 12 1 Using subsidies as an equalizing mechanism
allows CHI programs to require more affordable contributions. 22
Finally, although the concept of pooling risk is novel in the informal
sector in Yemen, CHI programs should engage in information
campaigns that describe CHI in a culturally relevant way. For example,
CHI programs could explain risk pooling by relating it to traditional
mutual-aid initiatives and zakat, an annual charitable tax comprising
2.5 percent of income. 123 Yemeni citizens take this tax seriously, and, if
115. See id.
116. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 801.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See SCHWEFELET AL., supra note 7, at 20.
120. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 808.
121. See id. at 807.
122. See id.
123. See SCHWEFELET AL., supra note 7, at 21.
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the tax could be collected reliably, it would generate between YER 700
to 1,000 million per year.124
B. Stewardship at the National Level
Government support and stewardship will be necessary for the state
to ensure the overall success of its health system, 125 especially since a
large number of CHI programs in rural Yemen would provide coverage
in areas that would likely have sustainability issues resulting from low
membership. The NHIA can do this by performing a number of tasks to
help steer CHI programs to an eventual national health insurance
system. 126 These tasks include providing financial management,
decentralizing decision-making authority, and monitoring the CHI
programs to promote accountability and quality assurance. 127
1. Financial Management
While CHI schemes are premised on a system of prepayment, they
do not exclusively have to rely on household contributions but rather
can be subsidized by "central [or] local government, [and] national or
international NGOs." 128 This notion is supported by research suggesting
that CHI schemes will not reach the most vulnerable unless their
membership is subsidized. 129 To raise funds for such subsidies, Yemen
could levy "sin taxes" on cigarettes or qat or hypothecate the tax on oil
or big equipment.130
In addition to its co-financing role, the NHIA should engage in
strategic purchasing, which consists of choosing the best benefits,
providers, and payment methods.131 In choosing the best benefits
package to offer through CHI, the NHIA will have to balance the most
pressing health needs of the informal sector with the financial situation
124. Id.
125. See WHO, Community Based Health Insurance Schemes in Developing Countries:
Facts, Problems and Perspectives, 26, EIP/FER/DP.E.03.1 (2003) (Guy Carrin).
126. See id.; see also Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 805 (noting that CHIs can be used
as starting points for scaling up to larger risk pools).
127. See Carrin, supra note 125, at 26-27; see also WHO, Reaching Universal Coverage
via Social Health Insurance: Key Design Features in the Transition Period, 41-42,
EIP/FER/DP.04.2 (2004) (Guy Carrin & Chris James) (describing the government's
stewardship role in developing social health insurance).
128. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 801.
129. See id. at 804.
130. SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 106.
131. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 801.
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of the country. 132 Because of the geographic isolation of some of its
citizens in rural areas, the NHIA should include transportation costs in
its benefits package. 133 Additionally, the definition of the benefits
package should include strict gatekeeping and referral practices, 134
which would prevent the inefficient practice found in Yemen today
whereby Yemenis bypass lower-level primary care facilities and go
directly to higher-level general hospitals.135 But shifting to a primary
health care base would first require educating the public on the benefits
of primary care. 136
To choose the best providers, the CHI scheme would be limited to
the existing health care infrastructure in any given geographic area. In
rural areas, for example, the national health insurance body will be
limited to choosing the nearest public health provider, whereas in urban
areas it can choose among the best public and private providers. 137
For ease of administration, the best payment mechanism for CHI
programs is capitation, "where providers receive payment according. to
the size of the population served."'138 With capitation payment, there is
no incentive for overproduction; however, capitation does give rise to
potential underproduction (that is, providers might have the incentive
to use the least amount of funds received through capitation in order to
pocket the unused part).139 While underproduction can be avoided by
fostering competition in urban areas (because providers' income depends
on the number of patients served), the same cannot be said for rural
areas, where the best solution may be to capitate groups of providers
together. 140 Altogether, strategic purchasing serves as an indicator of
access to cost-effective health care.' 4'
132. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 98-99.
133. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 802. But cf. Irene Akua Agyepong & Sam Adjei,
Public Social Policy Development and Implementation: A Case Study of the Ghana
National Health Insurance Scheme, 23 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 150, 153 (2008) (citing
research that suggests "quality of care and ability to pay may sometimes be more
important barriers than geographic access").
134. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 807.
135. For discussion of the Yemeni population's lack of faith in the lower levels of the
public health system, see MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 60, at 18 and SCHWEFEL
ET AL., supra note 7, at 34-35.
136. WHO, Planning and Implementing Health Insurance in Developing Countries:
Guidelines and Case Studies, 26, WHO/ICOIMESD 2.7 (Oct. 1993) (Aviva Ron).
137. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 50-51 (discussing the imbalance of facilities
between urban and rural areas and noting that improving rural care is one of the highest
priorities for a national health scheme).
138. Carrin & James, supra note 127, at 38.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 802.
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2. Decentralization
Decentralization plays a key role in the effective implementation of
CHI because "community participation in management, cost recovery,
and the setting up of effective motivational systems cannot be
implemented if the overall system remains centralized."142 For example,
successful CHI schemes in Uganda delegated to local communities
decision-making authority regarding community sensitization, collection
of contributions, and monitoring for abuse, whereas financial
management and monitoring quality of care remained centralized. 143 A
similar arrangement would be suitable for the CHI scheme in Yemen
until the NHIA, with international assistance, is able to further develop
management capacity at the community level. Ultimately,
decentralization would help create greater community commitment to
the system. 144
To rebuild trust in the health system, Yemen should find an entry
point in communities that is already trusted by the population. 145 For
example, the Social Fund for Development (SFD) in Yemen already has
experience providing both financing to community organizations to
allow them to manage basic health services and technical assistance in
developing management capacity. 146 This strategy would promote a
more comprehensive approach to addressing issues that go beyond
health financing yet still affect the overall health of the population.
Such cooperation would be familiar to the actors involved as Yemen's
Ministry of Public Health has planned to cooperate with the SFD to
address the following issues: "[p]overty alleviation through setting up
micro-enterprise projects[,] [g]irls' education[,] [p]rovision of safe
drinking water[,] [s]anitation and environmental health[,] [and]
[i]mprovement of health facility infrastructure."'147
3. Accountability
Decentralized decision-making authority in the health sector could
promote accountability among citizens and policymakers.'48
142. MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 60, at 14.
143. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 807.
144. See MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 60, at 14.
145. Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 803.
146. Sameh E1-Saharty et al., supra note 114, at 21; see also MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH,
supra note 60, at 35-36 (noting that the SFD cooperates with other organizations on
development projects).
147. Id. at 35.
148. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, Accountability and Health Systems: Toward Conceptual
Clarity and Policy Relevance, 19 HEALTH POL'Y & PLAN. 371, 371 (2004).
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Accountability is "the obligation of individuals or agencies to provide
information about, [or] justification for, their actions to other actors,
along with the imposition of sanctions for failure to comply [or] to
engage in appropriate action."'149 The NHIA, in its stewardship capacity,
would oversee such a system of responsibility and sanctions. 150 Given
the prevalence of both unofficial and official user fees, effectively
implementing accountability in health financing has the potential to
curb abuses of power and would help regain the public's confidence. 15
Accountability serves three purposes in health systems: (1) financial
accountability promotes control over the abuse of public resources and
authority; (2) performance accountability ensures that proper legal
procedures are followed; and (3) political accountability improves public
management by making it more responsive to constituent needs. 152
Within the Welfare Regime Framework, top-down oversight in Yemen
would consist of financial and performance oversight of CHI schemes by
the NHIA, and bottom-up accountability would result from the
government being held responsible for its oversight of the NHIA by
voters in democratic elections.
To identify institutional capacity gaps, all the stakeholders involved
at the international, national, and local levels will need to trace all of
the accountability relationships both within and without the public
health bureaucracy in Yemen. This process can be operationalized by
mapping out a matrix of all of the health system actors. 153 By plotting
out the intersection of the various actors, the nature of information
requirements and ability to impose sanctions can be determined for
each relationship. Each relationship would indicate the strength of the
actors' capacity to supply information or respond to sanctions, or,
conversely, to demand information or impose sanctions. A matrix that
shows too few accountability linkages likely will suffer from corrupt
practices, whereas a matrix with too many will have limited
effectiveness. 5 4 Ultimately, striking the right balance of accountability
linkages will aid in effectively implementing health insurance reform in
the informal sector.
149. Id. at 372.
150. See generally id. (defining answerability as the requirement to provide information
and answer questions, and sanctions as the ability to impose punishment).
151. See id. at 373.
152. See id. at 373-74 (specifying that financial accountability refers to the ability to
track expenses for the purposes of auditing, budgeting, and accounting; performance
accountability ensures the quality of service; and political accountability refers to
measures used to ensure the government maintains commitments made to the health
system and that it does not become a political tool).
153. See, e.g., id. at 376-77.
154. See id. at 377.
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4. Quality Assurance
The role of the NHIA in contracting with health providers to offer
defined benefits packages means it can also require them to meet
quality standards. 155 "Quality" in health systems is defined by the
criteria selected to evaluate it.156 Three of the principal objectives of
quality assurance are: (1) complying with the societal commitment of
the government to efficiently protect public health, (2) monitoring the
quality of services provided, and (3) using quality assessment for
research purposes to define the role of the patient in the health
system. 15 7 In addition to the unregulated nature of the private sector
and lack of developed management information systems, Yemen also
lacks the capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate health
outcomes. 158 Accordingly, much technical assistance would be needed at
the international level to develop standards and create hospital
accreditation programs.
Given the gaps in management capacity, efforts should focus on the
structure of the health insurance system, which consists of physical
inputs, personnel, financial resources, and organizational
arrangements. 15 9 Even without developed information systems, Yemen
can still put in place management strategies that seek to improve
quality. Moreover, an evaluation of a quality management system for a
hospital in Yemen identified several determinant factors of patient
satisfaction (such as nearby services, good staff attitude, and
cleanliness) and dissatisfaction (such as lack of drugs, poor staff
attitude, and poor lab services).1 60
Bearing in mind the relationship of patient satisfaction and quality,
the NHIA could adopt a system-wide management approach based on
continuous quality improvement (CQI). CQI involves four processes: (1)
"transforming the organizational culture to one focused totally on
[patient] satisfaction"; (2) "empowering employees at all levels to
improve organizational processes"; (3) "integrating support systems and
methods to motivate and reward employees on the basis of quality and
productivity"; and (4) "committing ... management to ... decentralized
decision-making, and a systems approach to managing
155. See id. at 373.
156. See World Bank, Managing the Quality of Health Care in Developing Countries, at
6 (Mar. 1995) (Willy De Geyndt).
157. See id. at 7.
158. See SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 33.
159. Brinkerhoff, supra note 148, at 34.
160. SCHWEFEL ET AL., supra note 7, at 48.
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organizational change." 161 Under this management approach, the NHIA
would continually seek to improve its stewardship tasks because "health
sector reform is a continuous, dynamic and evolving process, and
strategies may need to be reconsidered during implementation." 162
C. Role of International Donors
International donors play an important role in social policy reform,
especially where 'governments demonstrate political will to foster
development, but lack capacity."'1 63 International assistance in health-
related projects typically consists of the provision of technical
assistance, 164 such as developing the administrative and management
capacity necessary for CHI programs to be successful. 165 These skills
include "setting of contributions, collection of contributions and
compliance, determination of the benefit package, marketing and
communication, contracting with providers, management information
systems, and accounting."'166 In Yemen, such external assistance in
health spending has played a key role. 67 For example, in 1998, it
accounted for 25 percent of the total health expenditure in the public
sector, which amounted to USD 33 million. Most of this support
(roughly two-thirds) was for technical assistance, while 26 percent was
for investment and 9 percent for budget support.168 International
assistance should follow a sector-wide approach, and financial
assistance should be coordinated through multi-donor trust funds.
161. De Geyndt, supra note 156, at 20.
162. E1-Saharty et al., supra note 114, at 23; see also Abdulwahed Al Serouri et al.,
Strengthening Health Systems in Yemen: Review of Evidence and Implications for Effective
Actions for the Poor, in HEALTH MANAGEMENT: DIFFERENT APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS
285, 292 (Krzysztof Smigorski ed., 2011) ("There is evidence that implementation
effectiveness is increased by providing continuous feedback to the strategy team and
leaders about health service needs, constraints, implementation progress, and health
service impact.").
163. World Bank, Service Delivery in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States, at 24 (Mar.
15, 2010) (Mark Baird) (quoting OECD, Principles for Good International Engagement in
Fragile States and Situations, at 3 (Apr. 2007)).
164. See, e.g., World Bank, Yemen Health and Population, at 5, Report No. AB1735
(July 28, 2008).
165. See Carrin et al., supra note 21, at 806 (noting that many small CHI programs lack
the resources to hire professional management, leading to management-related and
administrative issues).
166. Id.
167. See EI-Saharty et al., supra note 114, at 22.
168. Id.
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1. Sector- Wide Approach
In a transitioning country like Yemen, international donors should
avoid activities that would undermine national reform efforts, "'such as
developing parallel systems without thought to transition mechanisms
and long-term capacity development."' 169 To avoid such pitfalls,
international donors should follow a sector-wide approach (SWAp).
SWAp changes how international donors cooperate with institutions at
the national level in two ways: (1) "donor procedures are harmonized, so
that they follow one system"; and (2) "donors use national systems for
monitoring performance . . . with strong coordination in financial
management."'170 In order for this arrangement to work, it must be
implemented so that the resulting management systems are trusted
both by donors and the government. 171
SWAp represents a shift away from the traditional project-based
approach of international involvement. The old approach saw
international donors take on projects in certain geographic areas,
develop their own management system, and then hand over their model
to the government after withdrawing from the project.172 But under the
old approach, the systems typically collapsed once the donors pulled
out.173 The old systems failed partly because they developed parallel to
dysfunctional national systems, thereby keeping them immune from the
problems of the national system, at least while the donor remained
involved.174 Once the donors left, the problems of the national system
were allowed to take over. 175 With SWAp, donor involvement would
have to work at both the national and community level to guarantee
effectiveness. 176 In other words, international donors are an important
part of the welfare mix within the welfare regime's top-down and
bottom-up design.
2. Multidonor Trust Funds
Under SWAp, international donors must also coordinate their
financial contributions to prevent the creation of parallel systems that
SWAp seeks to avoid. One method that has already shown success in
169. Baird, supra note 163, at 24 (quoting OECD, supra note 163, at 3).
170. MINISTRY OF PUB. HEALTH, supra note 60, at 37.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 38.
174. See id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 39.
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Afghanistan is the use of Multidonor Trust Funds (MDTFs).177 MDTFs
are appropriate for Yemen because they can be used "to coordinate
budget support in countries where fiduciary risks are high, while also
building the capacity of the state to manage and control its own
budget."178 This funding approach requires donors to act more as
investors in a venture capital fund, which requires them to be willing to
take on "fiduciary, developmental and reputational risks."179
Accordingly, measures taken to further accountability and quality
assurance will be crucial in fostering trust with international donors.
CONCLUSION
Global processes in Yemen's health system have thus far left behind
the informal sector while allowing the private health sector to thrive. In
order to protect Yemen's largely poor and rural citizens in the informal
sector from excessive out-of-pocket health expenditures, globalization
now necessitates a more comprehensive approach to health reform that
involves cooperation among local, national, and global stakeholders.
This cooperation requires both decentralizing decision-making to the
community level and effecting accountability and quality assurance
measures to rebuild trust in Yemen's national health system. The
Welfare Regime Framework is both general enough to accommodate
these global requirements and flexible enough to tailor adequate legal
reforms for overcoming the various hurdles of Yemen's health system.
Although Yemen faces many challenges in expanding access to its
health system, passing legal reforms to implement CHI programs would
represent an important step in fulfilling its constitutional promise of
providing its citizens with access to health and can pave the way for
future social policy reforms.
177. See Baird, supra note 163, at 27-28.
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id.
